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Abstract
Web services represent a challenge and an opportunity for organizations wishing to expose product
and services oﬀerings through the Internet. The Web service technology provides an environment
in which service providers and consumers can discover each other and conduct business transactions
through the exchange of XML-based documents. However, any organization using XML and Web
Services must ensure that only the right users, sending the appropriate XML content, can access
their Web Services. Access control policy speciﬁcation for controlling access to Web services is
then becoming an emergent research area due to the rapid development of Web services in modern
economy.
This paper is an eﬀort to understand the basic concepts for securing Web services and the require-
ments for implementing secure Web services. We describe the design and implementation of a Web
service architecture for enforcing access control policies, the overall rationale and some speciﬁc
choices of our design are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Accessing information on the global Internet has become an essential require-
ment of the modern economy. Web services, which are developed for this
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purpose, represent a new technology that permits the exchange of informa-
tion through the network, using standard protocols and allowing communica-
tion between heterogeneous architectures. Today Web services are essentially
based on four standards [8]: the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [14],
the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [17], the Web Services Descrip-
tion Language [18] (WSDL), and the Universal Discovery, Description and
Integration (UDDI) [19]. While XML Web services are an increasingly suc-
cessful paradigm for the development of complex Web-based applications, the
original speciﬁcations of their underlying technologies did not even mention
security. It is therefore easy to understand why security is currently one of the
biggest concerns about future development of XML Web services. Speciﬁcally,
two main issues need to be addressed:
• restricting access to an XML Web service to authorized users;
• protecting the integrity and conﬁdentiality of XML messages exchanged in
a Web service environment.
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem that both these issues can be addressed straight-
forwardly by relying on the security techniques already used for Web sites.
For instance, HTTPS (i.e., HTTP over the Secure Sockets Layer protocol) is
typically used as a tool for encrypting private information. It can also pro-
vide authentication, but it is only used to authenticate the identity of the
Web server to the client. It is capable of authenticating the client identity to
the server, but most Web servers are not set up for that. However, HTTPS
cannot provide, for example, authorization, that is, it cannot regulate what
a user is attempting to do and selectively allowing/disallowing the operation.
The result is that HTTPS is a good solution for providing strong encryption
and server identity authentication to the client and vice versa. Also, HTTPS
is a “point-to-point” security, which does not allow intermediaries to act on
the data, and requires trust between the HTTPS end-point and the location
of the application being secured.
Recently, the technology industry has been working on various XML-based
security languages to provide comprehensive and uniﬁed security solutions
for Web services. These languages include the Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) [28] and the Web Services Security speciﬁcation (WS-
Security) [20]. SAML is an XML-based framework for exchanging security
information developed by the OASIS organization. The SAML speciﬁcation
deﬁnes how to represent security credentials (assertions in SAML) using XML.
SAML is designed to enable secure single-sign-on to applications within or-
ganizations and across companies and supports many diﬀerent authentication
mechanisms such as the combination of username and password, SSL client-
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side certiﬁcate, X.509 certiﬁcate, and so on. After the subject authentication,
the server SAML returns a particular security token to the client that makes
the initial request. WS-Security speciﬁcation has been developed by IBM,
Microsoft, and Verisign. WS-Security is a means of using XML to encrypt
and digitally sign SOAP messages. It also provides a mechanism for passing
security tokens for authentication and authorization for the SOAP messages.
A typical example of security token is a user name and password token, in
which a user name and password are included as text.
Another important aspect to be considered for securing Web services is
the access control whose solution requires investigating policies for specify-
ing access control rules together with a language for expressing them, and
an architecture for their enforcement. Several proposals have been intro-
duced for access control to distributed heterogeneous resources from multiple
sources [3,4,5,6]. Two relevant access control languages using XML are WS-
Policy [21] and XACML [25]. Based on the WS-Security, WS-Policy includes a
set of general messaging related assertions deﬁned in WS-PolicyAssertions [23]
and a set of security policy assertions related to supporting the WS-Security
speciﬁcation deﬁned in WS-SecurityPolicy [22]. In addition to the WS-Policy,
WS-PolicyAttachment [24] deﬁnes how to attach these policies to Web ser-
vices or other subjects such as service locators. The eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [25] is the result of a recent OASIS standard-
ization eﬀort proposing an XML-based language to express and interchange
access control policies. XACML is designed to express authorization policies
in XML against objects that are themselves identiﬁed in XML. The language
can represent the functionalities of most policy representation mechanisms.
In this paper we provide an overview of the Web Service technology, and
illustrate the basic concepts for securing Web services. We then describe the
design of a Web service architecture for enforcing access control policies and
provide an example of implementation based on the WS-Policy as access con-
trol language [2]. Note, however, that our proposal is completely independent
from the speciﬁc access control language and can be therefore used with any
other solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 illustrates
the basic characteristics of WS-Policy. Section 3 presents our architecture.
Section 4 describes how the access control is enforced. Finally, Section 5
presents our conclusions.
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Value Meaning
wsp:Required The assertion must be applied to the subject. If the assertion is not
satisfy, a fault or error will occur.
wsp:Rejected The assertion is not supported and if present will cause failure.
wsp:Optional The assertion may be applied but it is not required.
wsp:Observed The assertion will be applied and requestors of the service are informed
that the policy will be applied.
wsp:Ignored The assertion is processed, but ignored; no action will be taken as a
result of it being speciﬁed. Requestors are informed that the policy will
be ignored.
Fig. 1. Values for attribute Usage
2 WS-Policy overview
Web Service Policy framework (WS-Policy) provides a generic model and a
ﬂexible and extensible grammar for describing and communicating the policies
of a Web service [21]. Other speciﬁcations, such as WS-PolicyAssertions [23]
and WS-SecurityPolicy [22], provide speciﬁc applications of this grammar for
their domains. A policy is a collection of one or more policy assertions that
represent an individual preference, requirement, capability, or other proper-
ties that have to be satisﬁed to access the policy subject associated with the
assertion. The XML representation of a policy assertion is called policy expres-
sion. 5 Element wsp:Policy is the container for a policy expression. Policy
assertions are typed and can be simple or complex . A simple assertion can
be compared to other assertions of the same type without any special con-
sideration about their semantics. A complex assertion requires an assertion
type-speciﬁc means of comparison. The assertion type can be deﬁned in such
a way that the assertion is parametrized. For instance, an assertion describ-
ing the maximum acceptable password size (number of chars) would likely
accept an integer parameter indicating the maximum char count. In contrast,
an assertion that simply indicates that a password is required does not need
parameters; its presence is enough to convey the assertion. Every assertion
is associated with a mandatory attribute called Usage that speciﬁes how the
assertion should be processed. Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁve possible values for
attribute Usage together with their meaning.
In cases where there are multiple choices for granting a given access (e.g.,
diﬀerent authentication mechanisms), attribute wsp:preference can be used
to establish an order among the diﬀerent choices. Possible values for attribute
5 Note that using XML to represent policies facilitates interoperability between heteroge-
neous platforms and Web service infrastructures.
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<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp=". . ." xmlns:wsse=". . .">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All wsp:Preference="100">
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:Kerberosv5TGT</wsse:TokenType>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:UsernameToken</wsse:TokenType>
<wsse:Username>Alice</wsse:Username>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
</wsp:All>
<wsp:All wsp:Preference="1">
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:X509v3</wsse:TokenType>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:UsernameToken</wsse:TokenType>
<wsse:Username>Alice</wsse:Username>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
</wsp:All>
<wsp:PolicyReference URI="#opts" />
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
(a)
<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsse=". . ." xmlns:ns=". . .">
<wsp:All wsu:Id="opts">
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:X509v3</wsse:TokenType>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:UsernameToken</wsse:TokenType>
<wsse:Username>Bob</wsse:Username>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:Policy>
(b)
Fig. 2. A simple example of policy (a) and the corresponding referred policy (b)
wsp:preference are integers, where a higher number represents a higher pref-
erence. WS-Policy also provides an element, called wsp:PolicyReference,
that can be used for sharing policy expressions between diﬀerent policies.
Conceptually, when a reference is present, it is replaced by the content of
the referenced policy expression. Policy assertions are combined by using the
following policy operators :
• wsp:All requires that all of its child elements be satisﬁed;
• wsp:ExactlyOne requires that exactly one of its child elements be satisﬁed;
• wsp:OneOrMore requires that at least one of its child elements be satisﬁed.
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Lack to specify a policy operator is equivalent to specify the wsp:All
operator. Figure 2(a) illustrates a simple example of policy stating that the
access is granted if exactly one security token among the following is provided:
i) a Kerberos certiﬁcate and a UsernameToken with Username Alice, ii)
an X509 certiﬁcate and a UsernameToken with Username Alice, or iii) an
X509 certiﬁcate and a UsernameToken with Username Bob. The third option
corresponds to the referred policy, called opts, illustrated in Figure 2(b).
3 System architecture
We describe our architecture for enforcing access control policies [3]. The
proposed architecture satisﬁes the following requirements.
• Modularity: it includes diﬀerent modules (i.e., the PAP, PEP, and PAP
modules described in the following) that can be realized by diﬀerent parties
thus reducing, for example, the development time.
• Policies language independency: it is independent from the speciﬁc access
control language used for specifying restrictions. Therefore, diﬀerent access
control languages can be adopted such as WS-Policy (used in our imple-
mentation) or XACML.
• Extensibility: it can be easily extended by adding modules thus resulting in
additional levels of control (see Figure 4).
• Re-usability: the architecture’s modules can be re-used and shared among
diﬀerent entities making the architecture generic and scalable.
• High performance: it provides a low time response to eventually support
real-time applications.
• Hardware and software independency: it allows the distribution of diﬀerent
modules on diﬀerent machines and with diﬀerent operating systems. This
independency is related to the programming language used for the imple-
mentation of the architecture.
• Programming language independency: the modules’ developers can use the
preferred programming language without any restriction. In other words,
the developers can select the preferred programming language for the im-
plementation of our architecture.
As shown in Figure 3, the architecture includes an Enforcer module that
wraps up entirely the computation of access permissions to individual Web
services, returning, for each request, the decision of whether the access should
be granted or denied. Internally, the Enforcer is composed of three main
modules implemented as Web services [10]:
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Fig. 3. System Architecture
• The Policy Decision Point (PDP) module receives an access request and
returns a “yes” or “no” decision.
• The Policy Evaluation Point (PEP) module interacts with the PAP that
encapsulates the information needed to identify the applicable policies. It
then evaluates the request against the applicable policies and returns the
ﬁnal decision to the PDP module.
• The Policy Administration Point (PAP) module retries the policies appli-
cable to a given access request and returns them to the PEP module.
The use of these modules can be regulated by means of an instance of
PDP-PEP-PAP. For instance, if the PAP module requires the authentication
of the PEP module, the PAP module has to create a new PDP and at least
a pair of PEP-PAP (see Figure 4). Client and service represent the entity
submitting an access request and the target service, respectively. A service
contains a set of publicly available functions that clients can invoke. To ﬁx
ideas and make concrete examples, in the following we consider the simple
Web service illustrated in Figure 5. This Web service contains two functions,
called TemptureFAut and TemptureCAut, which convert temperatures from
Fahrenheit to Celsius and vice versa.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the system components. We
then describe how access requests submitted by clients are processed.
3.1 Policy Administration Point (PAP)
The PAP module is a policy repository that provides an administrative inter-
face for inserting, updating, and deleting policies. One of the most important
features of this interface is that it can prevent from inserting invalid poli-
cies and from executing update operations that generate invalid policies: a
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Fig. 4. Waterfall Authentication
Fig. 5. A simple example of Web service
validation function ensures that the policies are well-formed. The PAP ad-
ministrative interface is depicted in Figure 6.
The PAP module invocation is realized with the following function:
Public Class PAP : Inherits WebService
<WebMethod()> Public Function PolicyMatch(ByVal service As String,
ByVal method As String) As String()
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Public Class PAP : Inherits WebService
Public Function Insert( ByVal service As String, ByVal method As String,
ByVal policy As String)
...
End Function
Public Function Modify( ByVal service As String, ByVal method As String,
ByVal policy As String)
...
End Function
Public Function Delete(ByVal policy As String)
...
End Function
Public Function DeleteByService(ByVal service As String)
...
End Function
Public Function DeleteByMethod(ByVal method As String)
...
End Function
Public Function DeleteByServiceMethod(ByVal service As String, ByVal
method As String)
...
End Function
End Class
Fig. 6. Administrative interface of the PAP module
. . .
End Function
End Class
The main purpose of this module is to retrieve the policies applicable to
a given access request. The PAP module performs a search in the reposi-
tory based on the received parameters (e.g., the service name and option-
ally the method name). In our implementation the repository is a relational
database that includes a table, called PolicyRepository, with three at-
tributes: Service, Method, and PolicyLocation. A tuple 〈s1,m1,path policy〉
in table PolicyRepository states that policy path policy is a policy applicable
to method m1 (if any) of service s1. The policies applicable to a given access
request are stored in an array that is then returned to the PEP module.
Example 3.1 Consider the Web service illustrated in Figure 5. The cor-
responding PolicyRepository is illustrated in Figure 7. It states that the
policies applicable to method TemptureFAut of service TemperatureService
are stored in the /Policy/policy1.xml ﬁle. Analogously, policies applicable
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Service Method PolicyLocation
TemperatureService TemptureFAut /Policy/policy1.xml
TemperatureService TemptureCAut /Policy/policy2.xml
Fig. 7. An example of policy repository
to method TemptureCAut of service TemperatureService are stored in the
/Policy/policy2.xml ﬁle.
3.2 Policy Evaluation Point (PEP)
The PEP module realizes the enforcement of the policies returned by the PAP
module. The access request is granted if at least one policy is satisﬁed; the
access is denied otherwise. In this latter case, the PEP module returns to
the client an exception string indicating the error (see Section 4). The PEP
module invocation is realized with the following interface:
<WebMethod()> Public Function Evaluation(ByVal MethodName As String,
ByVal theCallHeader As theHeaderClass) As Boolean
...
End Function
More precisely, the PEP module works as follows. The PEP module creates
a SAXParser [15] for analyzing the policies and enforces them iteratively. The
enforcement phase can generate two possible events: i) a policy is satisﬁed,
the enforcement process terminates, and the access request is granted; ii) a
policy is not satisﬁed, an exception is raised and stored in a vector. To verify
whether a policy is satisﬁed or not, all assertions in the policy are evaluated.
This evaluation depends on the assertion type and on the subelements of the
assertions. After that all policies have been evaluated and none of them is
satisﬁed, the PEP module selects the exception with the highest priority and
sends it to the service.
Example 3.2 The PEP module evaluates the following assertions’ types as
follows.
• SecurityToken. The PEP module extracts from the access request
all elements whose type is that speciﬁed in the attribute TokenType
(e.g., UsernameToken, X509SecurityToken, and Kerberos) and compares
them with the SecurityToken element speciﬁed in the policy. If the
SecurityToken has not subelements, the assertion is evaluated to true if
the access request includes a token of the same type of that speciﬁed in
the policy. Otherwise, if the SecurityToken has some subelements (e.g.,
SubjectName, UsePassword, Password), the assertion is evaluated to true
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if there is a (partial/exact) match between the information speciﬁed in the
access request and the information contained in these subelements.
• MessageAge. The SAXParse compares the timestamp (or, more precisely,
the creation date) associated with the access request and the current date
and time. If the diﬀerence between these two values is less than the value
speciﬁed in the attribute Age, then the assertion is evaluated to true.
• Language. The SAXParse veriﬁes whether the access request contains a
certiﬁcate that speciﬁes the requested language.
3.3 Policy Decision Point (PDP)
The PDP module is the interface between the service and the Enforcer.
The service creates an instance of PDP and call the following web method
Response by using a SOAP message.
<WebMethod()> Public Function Response(ByVal theHeader As theHeaderClass,
ByVal ServiceName As String, ByVal MethodName As String) As Boolean
Return MyPEP.Evaluation(ServiceName, MethodName, theHeader)
End Function
The body of the SOAP message is used for communicating the target
service name and/or method name and the header can be used for specifying
additional information (e.g., information for authenticating the service to the
PDP). The PDP module instantiates one or more PEP modules that can be
based on diﬀerent policy repositories (PAPs). The interaction between each
pair PEP-PAP can return a diﬀerent decision; the PDP module deﬁnes a
policy for establishing how to compute a ﬁnal decision based on the responses
of each PEP. Diﬀerent decision criteria could be adopted, each applicable in
speciﬁc situations. A natural and straightforward decision policy is the one
stating that the exception raised by the PEP module with the highest priority
wins, or a majority policy can be adopted.
3.4 Exception handling
When there is an exception during the evaluation of an access request sub-
mitted by a client, the system should not only capture the exceptions, but
also communicate the exception to the client. Such a communication should
be performed in a platform-independent way. To accomplish this, we exploit
a tree structure based on DOM [16]. Intuitively, the leaves of the tree are the
assertions and the internal nodes are the boolean operators (All, OneOrMore,
ExactlyOne corresponding to and, or, and xor) used for combining the as-
sertions. The PEP module simpliﬁes the tree evaluating its leaves to true
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<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<xs:schema xmlns:targetNamespace="http://seth/errors"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<xs:element name="All" type="Compositor"/>
<xs:element name="ExactlyOne" type="Compositor"/>
<xs:element name="OneOrMore" type="Compositor"/>
<xs:element name="Error" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:complexType name="Compositor">
<xs:group ref="CompositorContent" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:group name="CompositorContent">
<xs:choice>
<xs:element ref="All"/>
<xs:element ref="ExactlyOne"/>
<xs:element ref="OneOrMore"/>
<xs:element ref="Error" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:group>
<xs:group name="root">
<xs:choice>
<xs:element ref="All"/>
<xs:element ref="ExactlyOne"/>
<xs:element ref="OneOrMore"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:group>
<xs:element name="ErrorsReport" type="ErrorsReportExpression"/>
<xs:complexType name="ErrorsReportExpression">
<xs:group ref="root" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
Fig. 8. XSD Schema of message errors
or false. Then, the evaluation tree is simpliﬁes using the usual boolean laws
for true and false. If the access request is denied, the Enforcer has to report
an error indicating the reason for which the access request has been rejected.
Such a error message can specify, for example, that there is no a particular
certiﬁcate or there is no a pair username-password. In our system, the error
messages are in XML format and are well-formed with respect to the XSD
schema shown in Figure 8.
4 Access request enforcement
We now describe the enforcement in more details. Suppose that user
Alice issues an access request for the method TemptureFaut of the service
TemperatureService illustrated in Figure 5. The access request evaluation
proceeds as follows.
C.A. Ardagna et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 47–6258
POST /QuoteService HTTP/1.1
SOAP-Action="http://www.acme.com/TemperatureService"
Content-Type: text/xml; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Length: nnnn
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
<SOAP-ENV:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse= "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/04/secext">
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3"
EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
<wsse:UsernameToken >
<wsse:Username>Alice</wsse:Username>
</wsse:UsernameToken>
</wsse:Security>
</SOAP-ENV:Header>
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<TemperatureService>
<TemptureFAut>32</TemptureFAut>
</TemperatureService>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
Fig. 9. An example of access request
<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsse=". . ." xmlns:wssx=". . .">
<wsp:All wsp:Preference="1" wsp:Usage="wsp:Required">
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:UsernameToken</wsse:TokenType>
<wsse:Username>Alice</wsse:Username>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:SecurityToken>
<wsse:TokenType>wsse:X509</wsse:TokenType>
<Claims>
<SubjectName>SubscriptionDate=“31/01/2004”</SubjectName>
</Claims>
</wsse:SecurityToken>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:Policy>
Fig. 10. An example of policy
• The access request issues by the client is passed to the requested service. In
our example, Alice issues the SOAP request illustrated in Figure 9, where,
for the sake of simplicity, the namespaces are omitted.
• The access request is then passed to the PDP module that instantiates one
or more PEP modules. The request is redirected to the PEP module by
using the Response method illustrated in Section 3.3.
• The PEP module sends the access request to the PAP module that
returns all the applicable policies. In our example, according to the
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PolicyRepository table illustrated in Figure 7, the PAP module re-
turns the policies speciﬁed in /Policy/policy1.xml and shown in Fig-
ure 10. It states that the access is granted if the access request includes a
UsernameToken with Username Alice and an X509 certiﬁcate declaring a
speciﬁc subscription date.
• The PEP module then evaluates the policies returned by the PAP module.
If the access is granted, the decision is sent to the service that in turn
returns the response to the client. Otherwise, an exception is returned. In
our example, the policy in Figure 10 evaluates to false because the X509
certiﬁcate contained in the access request does not include any information
about the subscription date. The error message returned to the client is as
follows.
<ErrorsReport>
<All>
<Error>Needed subscription date</Error>
</All>
</ErrorsReport>
5 Conclusions
XML-based Web services represent a challenge and an opportunity for orga-
nizations wishing to expose product and service oﬀerings through the Inter-
net. In such a context, security is currently one of the main concerns and
several initiatives are currently ongoing aimed at achieving a standardized
way for supporting integrity, conﬁdentiality, and access control for XML Web
services. In this paper, we have presented a Web service architecture for en-
forcing access control policies. We conclude by mentioning some interesting
future directions for extending our work.
• UDDI integration. Since the modules of the Enforcer have been imple-
mented as Web services, it is possible to integrate our architecture with an
UDDI register where the available PEP, PAP, and PDP can be registered. A
trusted PAP module can, for example, use the UDDI register for searching
a particular PEP satisfying given requirements.
• Certiﬁcate validation. In our system, the validation of a certiﬁcate is per-
formed by checking the creation date an the expiry date contained in the
certiﬁcate itself. The next evolution of our architecture could include a
certiﬁcation authority (CA).
• Other policy language speciﬁcation. Our architecture is completely indepen-
dent from the particular access control language adopted. We can then use
the architecture to realize an access control policy enforcement based on
other languages such as XACML.
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• Java and open source. Our architecture has been implemented in Visual
Basic and can be installed on Windows machines. Note, however, that as
discussed in Section 3, the architecture design is platform-independent. An
interesting alternative consists in implementing an open source, platform-
independent architecture based on Java services.
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